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NOTES
THE POWER OF THE COURT TO DETERMINE WIT-
NESS CREDIBILITY: A PROBLEM IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT FOR THE PROPONENT OF THE EVIDENCE
In every United States jurisdiction some procedure is provided for
the withdrawal of a civil case from the consideration of the jury and for
determination of the controversy by the court.' Such a procedure, of course,
is necessary to maintain the proper balance of functions between the fact-
finding body, the jury, and the law-determining organ, the judge. When
the course of a trial has been such that the evidence adduced will not support
a finding that certain facts existed which under the law are necessary to
impose or relieve of liability, the case must be withdrawn rather than permit
the jury to mold the law according to their own ad hoc notions. The most
widely recognized situation for withdrawal is that in which the party with the
burden of proof has failed to produce satisfactory evidence of all the ele-
ments necessary to establish his cause of action or affirmative defense.2 In
making a motion to withdraw the case from the jury here, the defendant,
if he is the challenging party, hypothetically admits the truth of all the evi-
dence which is favorable to the plaintiff's case. The court is then requested
to determine whether the facts which may be reasonably inferred from this
evidence are such as may make the defendant liable for the damages which
the plaintiff has sustained3 Similarly, when the allegations of the plaintiff's
cause of action have been admitted in the pleadings and the defendant in-
1. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2494-95 (3d ed. 1940). For convenience in this Note
the term "directed verdict" is used to connote that procedural device whereby the court
enters the verdict without submitting the case to the jury. In some jurisdictions the
procedure differs, but the result achieved is identical. In Virginia, for example, the
court is not permitted to "direct a verdict," but it may enter judgment notwithstanding
the verdict after the case has been submitted to the jury. VA. CODE ANN. §8-352
(1957). Louisiana appears to be the only jurisdiction in which a motion to withdraw
the case from the jury constitutes a waiver of the party's right to proceed with his
case in the event of an adverse ruling. Bartholomew v. Impastato, 12 So. 2d 700
(La. Ct. App. 1943).
2. 9 WIwoam, EvIDENCE §§ 2494-95 (3d ed. 1940).
3. Formerly, in determining whether a party had introduced sufficient evidence
to constitute a prima facie case or affirmative defense, the court demanded only a
"scintilla" of evidence, i.e., any evidence tending to support the requisite facts. This
doctrine has been generally abandoned, and the prevailing view today is that a party
must produce "substantial" evidence of the elements necessary to his case. Translated
into practice the doctrine of "substantial evidence" simply means that, while evidence
might be sufficiently probative to be admissible when presented, to warrant its submis-
sion to the jury it must be such that "reasonable persons" might fairly infer from it
the ultimate facts. Smith, The Power of the Judge To Direct a Verdict: Section
457-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, 24 CoLUm. L. Rzv. 111, 114-15 (1924);
Note, 10 Wyo. L. REv. 164 (1956). See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372
(1943).
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troduces evidence of an affirmative defense, the plaintiff as the moving party
admits the truth of the defendant's evidence and requests a determination
of whether the facts reasonably inferable therefrom are sufficient to relieve
his adversary of the liability which was previously admitted. The question
posed by such a motion is purely one of law. If the court finds that the only
facts which may be supported by the evidence are insufficient, it must imme-
diately decide the controversy. The determination of the verdict is here
withdrawn from the jury simply because the course of the trial has been
such as to call for no function which that body is capable of performing.
No inquiry need be made into the trustworthiness of the testimony intro-
duced; regardless of what the jury might consider to have actually been
proven, the most favorable finding for the challenged party could not alter
the result of the case.
In theory this might appear to be the only situation in which the court
could properly withdraw the case from the jury. If the party moving for
withdrawal does not challenge the legal sufficiency of his opponent's case,
but requests the court to direct the verdict on the basis of evidence which
the moving party has introduced, a fact issue is necessarily presented. The
verdict must turn on a finding of the accuracy of the movant's evidence.
The resolution of such factual issues has traditionally been considered to
be within the exclusive ambit of jury function.4  Ofttimes, however, the
course of the trial is such that the evidence of one party is either undisputed
and unimpeached by contrary evidence, or the opposing evidence is of such
a minimal quality that upon comparison it would seem that reasonable
minds could reach but a single factual conclusion. Since the court, in deter-
mining the legal sufficiency of an opponent's case, makes inquiry into the
question of whether there is evidence from which the jury might reasonably
find the necessary facts to allow the cause of action,5 it might be argued
that when there is no reasonable basis in the evidence for rejection of testi-
mony offered, the court should similarly refuse to permit the jury to
arbitrarily do so. The traditional answer to this contention is a doctrinaire
one: that the peculiar factual issue of the credibility of witnesses is a matter
absolutely within the province of the jury,6 and the court may not interfere
in its determination. Notwithstanding this general rule, there are a num-
ber of special situations and particular types of cases in which even the
most orthodox courts will create an exception and will withdraw the case
from the jury. A very few jurisdictions have entirely rejected the tradi-
tional doctrine and its exceptions, and now provide for the resolution of
all civil cases by the trial judge whenever the weight of the evidence is
such that a new trial would have been granted in the face of a contrary
verdict. It is the purpose of this Note to explore and analyze the variety
4. 9 Wiciops, EvimNcE § 2495 (3d ed. 1940).
5. See note 3 =pra.
6. MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944); 9 WIG-
moR, EvIDENcE § 2495 (3d ed. 1940).
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of contemporary doctrines concerning determination of credibility of wit-
nesses as they particularly relate to the procedural rules governing the
direction of a verdict for the proponent of the evidence.
THE RULE AGAINST DIRECTING A VERDICT FOR THE PROPONENT OF THE
EVIDENCE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The doctrine which commits the determination of the credibility of
witnesses to the jury is no flexible procedural concept but an absolute
direction to invest the triers of fact with sole responsibility. Allegations
are not established by the introduction of evidence until the jurors have
approved the reliability of the testimony. Even if the evidence is not op-
posed or contradicted, the opposing party may rely on the jury's supposed
ability to recognize inherent testimonial inaccuracy and simply reject it
as untrue. A case representative of the strictness with which the doctrine
is applied is MaDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R.7 This was an action brought
for the wrongful death of a nine-month-old child who was killed in a de-
railment of defendant's train. The plaintiff proved no more than the fact
that the child was a passenger on the railroad and that he met his death
because of the derailment, relying on the presumption of negligence raised
by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The defendant then introduced evi-
dence showing that the track had been deliberately dismantled at the point
of derailment by unknown saboteurs and that this action, for which the
railroad was not responsible, was the sole cause of the accident. Seventeen
witnesses who examined the track at this point testified concerning condi-
tions that clearly indicated sabotage. A loose rail was found lying in the
center of the tracks; the bolt holes on the rail were "clean and even"; the
spike holes at the rail's original position were similarly "clean," and the
angle bars, spikes and bolts which had been removed were found in a loca-
tion directly opposite to their normal position and undamaged, lying to-
gether with the claw bar and wrench with which the loose rail had obviously
been removed. The plaintiff made no attempt to impeach these witnesses
or to otherwise cast doubt on the accuracy of their testimony. The trial
court entered judgment n.o.v. for the defendant but was reversed on appeal.
While under the Pennsylvania view the presumption of negligence merely
shifted to the defendant the burden of coming forward with credible evidence
to explain the accident, the evidence introduced could not be considered
"credible" until the jury had approved it.8 The defendant was clearly held
7. 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944).
8. 348 Pa. at 565, 36 A.2d at 492. It should be noted that this attitude towards
the function of a presumption is somewhat peculiar to this state. It is to be distin-
guished from the orthodox Thayer view that a presumption casts only the burden
of coming forward with evidence on the opposing party, and upon the introduction of
such testimony the presumption "disappears from the case." Nor is it the more
generally accepted doctrine expressed in MODEm CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 13 (1942) that
the effect of a presumption is to cast the burden of persuasion upon the opponent.
Pennsylvania law in its treatment of certain presumptions has been characterized as
following the Thayer view (of shifting the burden of going forward with the evi-
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to be entitled to a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence,9 but the court was not authorized to enter final judgment.
Many jurisdictions which follow the general rule that credibility is an
issue exclusively for jury determination have developed a series of ex-
ceptions which permit the direction of a verdict for the proponent upon the
introduction of certain types of evidence or in certain types of cases. For
example, some courts have taken the position that negative evidence of the
non-existence of a fact may not stand in the face of positive evidence of the
existence of that fact; others provide that the jury may not disregard un-
contradicted evidence. A few courts have developed a special rule for the
direction of a verdict for the proponent of the evidence in actions for medical
malpractice, and many jurisdictions permit such a procedure in malicious
prosecution cases. In applying these doctrines, however, the courts fre-
quently avoid all mention of witness credibility. The unusual procedure
is treated as if dictated by a separate rule of law, with the courts either not
recognizing or not attempting to resolve the implicit conflict between these
doctrines and the general rule as to the scope of the jury's function. The
opinions, if they discourse further thain to baldly state the rule applied, often
justify the court's action on grounds of a public policy in favor of particular
types of litigants or on grounds of the peculiar persuasiveness of particular
types of evidence. These rationales, it would seem, go more to the question
of whether the jury may be trusted to return a verdict which actually
reflects their fair and honest evaluation of the accuracy of the evidence.
This is a consideration applicable to all cases alike and the institution of
jury trial in general, and does not address the basic question of whether
there is something peculiar in the course of the presentation of the evidence
in these trials which makes the credibility of the witnesses a less con-
troverted question of fact than in other cases. If there are such qualities in
these cases, it would seem that they should be recognized and treated
similarly whenever they appear. In describing the various doctrinal ex-
ceptions to the general rule, an attempt will be made to discover whether
such qualities do exist and whether they might properly be given a more
general application.
Negative Versus Positive Evidence
Let us first consider the rule that evidence of a negative character, i.e.,
evidence that something did not occur or did not exist, may not stand in
the face of contrary positive evidence of the fact. This doctrine has been
detected in the decisions of three jurisdictions. 10 The common case for
dence) with the added qualification that more than mere rebutting witnesses need be
presented. The jury must find such testimony credible before the burden of pro-
ducing evidence is satisfied. See Levin, Pensylvania and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence: Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1954).
9. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
10. All of these cases, except where otherwise indicated, involved the question
of whether lights were shown, or bell and whistle sounded by a railroad at a grade
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its application is that in which the plaintiff in a negligence action establishes
a prima facie case by the testimony of witnesses to the effect that they
were in a position to observe a particular occurrence had it taken place, but
that they failed to observe it, e.g., they heard no train whistle at a crossing
or they saw no lights on an automobile before an accident. In many situa-
tions this is the best possible evidence of the particular act of negligence
which is available to the plaintiff. Defendant then introduces witnesses
who testify that they did observe the thing to occur. Those courts applying
the rule would then hold that, since negative testimony may not be permitted
to stand in the face of sworn positive testimony by witnesses whose credi-
bility is not attacked or otherwise suspicious, the plaintiff has failed to
establish a case entitling him to go to the jury.-- Analysis will reveal,
however, that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff would have withstood
a motion for nonsuit at the close of his case, or would have been sufficient
to support a verdict for plaintiff had defendant introduced no evidence. It
is then clear that the verdict is directed solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced by the defendant which the jury is not permitted to reject; the
court has determined its testimonial accuracy.
It is diffcult to understand the basis for this doctrine. Certainly there
is no particular charm to positive testimony which insures its reliability.
Although there may be some element of probability that a person who failed
to observe an occurrence did so because of inattention or faulty perception
rather than because of its non-existence, that is hardly a conclusive indica-
tion of the accuracy of the opposing testimony. In practical operation,
however, the rule seems to be invoked in cases where the positive evidence,
aside from this quality, is otherwise peculiarly persuasive. In most of the
cases, the plaintiff's evidence was presented by one or two witnesses who
admittedly were not paying close attention while the opposing party pro-
duced a number of persons who, without any apparent interest in the
controversy and who appeared to have been in a position to have observed
the thing in question, claimed that it actually occurred. In one case, 12
for example, the fact in issue was the size of the tread of some steps from
which the plaintiff fell. While all plaintiff's witnesses guessed at the size
on the basis of their observations, only defendant had taken actual measure-
ments. No reason appeared why plaintiff had not similarly prepared her
case. Applying a variation of the negative-positive rule, the court held
that "mere guesses" could not stand in the face of positive sworn testi-
crossing. Franklin v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179 Minn. 480, 229 N.W.
797 (1930); Milk House Cheese Corp. v. Chicago, B. & Q.IRR., 161 Neb. 451, 73
N.W.2d 679 (1955); Nanfito v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 103 Neb. 577, 173 N.W. 575
(1919) ; Williams v. Pittsburgh, 349 Pa. 430, 37 A2d 540 (1944) (whether fire engine
sounded siren and bell); Haskins v. Pennsylvania R.R., 293 Pa. 537, 143 Atl. 192
(1928); Jorgenson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 231 Minn. 121, 42 N.W.2d
540 (1950) (dictum). But see Costack v. Pennsylvania R.R., 376 Pa. 341, 102 A.2d
127 (1954) (indicating that this doctrine may be dying or dead in Pennsylvania).
11. Ibd.
12. McIntyre v. Pittsburgh, 238 Pa. 524, 86 Ati. 300 (1913).
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mony as to the actual measurement, and, finding that the size thus proved
showed no negligence in construction, it directed the verdict for defendant.
The slim reed on which the court's logic in these cases might rest is that
when two opposing sets of testimony are presented and there is no reason
to suspect the sincerity of either, but the evidence might be more readily
harmonized on the theory that some witnesses merely failed to properly
observe the occurrence (of which the failure to perceive is itself some evi-
dence) than on a theory that the other witnesses were insincere (of which
there was no indication), it is unreasonable to permit the jury to find
otherwise. This, then, is to say that where there is some basis in the
evidence for one conclusion, and no basis for another, the one which finds
support must prevail. This rationale is seen to underlie some other doctrines
which provide for court determination of the question of credibility, as will
be presently discussed,'8 and if it properly explains the courts' actions here,
the "negative-positive" dogma may be merely a clumsy mode of describing
a particular situation in which the courts believe that that more general
rule is applicable. The assumption, however, that the failure to perceive is
itself some indication of faulty perception seems tenuous at best and hardly
an impelling reason to withdraw the question of witness sincerity from the
jury.
The Medical Malpractice Cases
Another exception to the general rule has been applied by a few
courts in the determination of actions for medical malpractice. Under the
substantive law of this action the plaintiff must establish the standard of
reasonable care by which the defendant's conduct is to be measured.' 4 This
standard is usually defined as that course of medical conduct which is ap-
proved by competent and reputable men of the profession of the same school
of medicine and practicing in the same community as the defendant.1 5 In
a carefully prepared case both plaintiff and defendant will introduce qualified
practitioners to testify as to whether the questioned treatment was or was
not in accordance with acceptable practice. If defendant's witnesses are
believed, a complete defense has been established. The law refrains from
resolving questions of medical propriety. Not only does the matter involve
technical understanding which may overly tax the competence of judges
and lay jurors, but recognizing that the state of the art is such that physi-
cians from varying schools frequently as firmly believe in the misguidance
of the medical theories of other schools as they are convinced of the healing
powers of their own practices, the court will not enter the arena of technical
medical controversy.Y6 So long as respectable physicians honestly believe
13. See text and notes accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
14. PROSSER, TORTS 133-34 (2d ed. 1955) ; Note, 35 MINN. L. PREv. 186 (1951).
15. PiossER, op. d. supra note 14, at 133-34.
16. It should be noted that this doctrine is restricted to those cases arising out
of a patient's treatment by a physician which involves a question of technical medical
[Vol. 107
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that the treatment which was administered is medically sound, it becomes
entirely irrelevant that other physicians consider the conduct harmful.
Upon such a record, however, most courts would refuse to withdraw the
case from the jury.17 Only the evidence favorable to the challenged party
may traditionally be considered on such a motion, and plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case. The jury must determine the trustworthiness
of the defendant's doctors' testimony. But said the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Smith v. Beard,'8 affirming a directed verdict for the defendant,
although this rule is ordinarily correct for most cases,19 since the substantive
law here only demands that the physician's
cccourse be approved by a respectable minority of the profession, it
would seem that it should make no difference whether that approval
appears in the case in chief made by plaintiff, or by evidence introduced
by the defendant. In fact it is difficult to see how the rule could be
effectually applied otherwise." 20
This attitude has been expressed by several other courts 21 which
similarly except this particular type of case from the general rule prohibiting
the direction of a verdict based on the moving party's own evidence. On
analysis, however, if there is any validity to the strict application of the
"credibility" doctrine in other cases, it would seem to make a great deal of
difference whether the evidence absolving the defendant from liability
"appears in the case in chief made by plaintiff" (whereupon plaintiff might
be bound by the testimony of his own witnesses 2) "or by the evidence in-
troduced by the defendant" (when the credibility of the latter's witnesses
the plaintiff is presumed to deny). The substantive law of medical mal-
practice, as it relates to the problem of determining the credibility of the
challenging party's witnesses, does not materially differ from the law of
technique. Where the injury results from a physician's conduct which is within the
common knowledge of laymen, and thus within their field of competence to understand
and appreciate, negligence is determined by the usual "reasonable man" standard
without the aid of professional testimony as to the standard of care. See Ales v. Ryan,
8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936) (failure of doctor to remove sponge left in patient's
abdomen during operation) ; Evans v. Roberts, 172 Iowa 653, 154 N.W. 923 (1915)
(part of patient's tongue cut off in removing adenoids) ; Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn.
App. 294, 205 S.W.2d 759 (1947) (needle left in patient's abdomen during operation
for appendicitis) ; PRossER, TORTS 134 (2d ed. 1955).
17. Phillips v. Stillwell, 55 Ariz. 147, 99 P.2d 104 (1940) ; Sales v. Bacigalupi,
47 Cal. App. 2d 82, 117 P.2d 399 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941) ; Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal. App.
2d 28, 45 P.2d 350 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935) ; Tomer v. Aiken, 126 Iowa 114, 101 N.W.
769 (1904); Stohlman v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 220 N.W. 247 (1928); White v.
Burton, 180 Okla. 499, 71 P.2d 694 (1937).
18. 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260 (1941).
19. 56 Wyo. at 394, 110 P.2d at 265.
20. 56 Wyo. at 400, 110 P.2d at 267.
21. Remley v. Plummer, 79 Pa. Super. 117 (1922) ; Blankenship v. Baptist Memo-
rial Hosp., 26 Tenn. App. 131, 168 S.W.2d 491 (1942); Dahl v. Wagner, 87 Wash.
492, 151 Pac. 1079 (1915). See also extensive citation in Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo.
375, 110 P.2d 260 (1941).
22. See 3 WiGmoan, EvIDENcE §§ 896-905 (3d ed. 1940).
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any other action wherein affirmative evidence established by the defendant
will effect a complete bar to recovery. The argument that the substantive
law in this case "could not be effectually applied otherwise" than by refusing
to permit the jury to return a verdict contrary to that which the court be-
lieves is demanded by the evidence would seem to apply to innumerable
cases. What is significant about the malpractice case, however, is that the
verdict generally does not turn on a choice between directly conflicting
evidence. The testimony of plaintiff's experts relates only to their own
personal experience in their practice of medicine, which is not in the least
inconsistent with a contrary experience by other physicians. It is not a
case where a finding that one set of witnesses testified accurately and truth-
fully demands that the opposing witnesses be found inaccurate or un-
truthful. Furthermore, the rule is not absolute, automatically calling for a
defendant's verdict upon the introduction of favorable expert testimony, but
as in the doctrine discussed in the previous section,2 its application is con-
ditioned on a finding by the trial judge that "there is nothing . . . to
indicate that the approval by defendant's witnesses is not honestly
made. . .. " 24 If this is a proper procedure here, it would seem that the
same kind of determination might be made in other cases, and the court
given like authority to withdraw the controversy from jury consideration.
However, what may lead these courts to invoke the rule specially here is
that the particular respectability of the defendant's witnesses in the mal-
practice cases serves to strikingly emphasize the absence from the evidence
of any indication which might serve as a reasonable basis for doubt as to
their testimonial truthfulness.
The Malicious Prosecution Cases
A doctrine similar to that found in the medical malpractice cases, but
far more universally applied, is found in malicious prosecution cases. To
gain recovery in such an action the plaintiff, who was innocent of any crime,
must prove that the defendant maliciously and without probable cause in-
stituted criminal proceedings against him.25 Probable cause is defined as
knowledge of such circumstances as might reasonably lead a person to
suspect the guilt of the accused.2 6 Quite properly the court must set the
minimum standard of the degree of proof which must come to the attention
of a citizen before he may turn the wheels of justice against one of his
fellows. The government encourages private prosecution as a means of law
enforcement, and the court must declare when citizens may bring charges
without liability for unintentional inaccuracy. So it is generally held; the
legal issue of what situations are sufficient to constitute probable cause is a
matter for the court's determination.2 7 Most jurisdictions go further, how-
23. See text and note accompanying note 11 supra.
24. Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 406, 110 P.2d 260, 270 (1941).
25. PRossER, ToRTs 645-46 (2d ed. 1955).
26. Id. at 652 and cases cited therein.
27. Id. at 658.
1958] THE COURT'S POWER TO DETERMINE CREDIBILITY 225
ever, and generally provide that when defendant's evidence tending to
show probable cause is uncontradicted and unimpeached, not inherently
improbable or suspicious, the factual as well as the legal question shall be
determined by the trial judge.28 Evidence on this issue almost invariably
proceeds from the defendant's own witnesses, and the doctrine is frankly
designed to permit the direction of the verdict for that party.2
The justification for this unusual procedure is frequently expressed in
terms of a public policy in favor of persons who perform their civic function
of reporting those suspected of crime.P0 Government officials at the highest
level are afforded absolute immunity from liability for erroneous prosecu-
tions; 31 lesser officials and private citizens ought to be protected from un-
warranted liability to the fullest measure that the law can devise. By
contrast, the innocent individual who is subjected to the criminal process
is unfortunately injured and an appealing object for compensation. Recog-
nizing that the jury's determination of credibility is frequently a mask to
cover their desire to shift the loss to a person who they believe can better
afford it and who they believe should be required to contribute,3 2 the courts
feel that the state's interest in encouraging honest efforts at law enforce-
ment is too great to permit an improper resolution of these cases. The
trial judge, then, assumes the role of evaluating the testimony himself. This
procedural justification-based on the type of defendant involved rather
than solely on the convincing character of the evidence itself-is directed
towards an issue disassociated from the question of whether accurate deter-
mination of credibility may best be made by the jury. The problem to
which it is addressed is whether the ambit of proper jury function includes
something more in the application of the law than a pure determination
of what conduct or occurrence actually took place. This is the notion that
underlying the traditional procedural doctrine requiring the submission of
28. Wolter v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 153 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ; Green v.
Norton, 233 Ala. 489, 172 So. 634 (1937) ; Wm. R. Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Mann,
171 Ark. 357, 284 S.W. 42 (1926) ; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pherson, 129 Colo.
502, 272 P.2d 643 (1954) ; Norman v. Young, 35 Ga. App. 221, 132 S.E. 414 (1926) ;
Butler v. Lewis, 318 Ill. App. 225, 47 N.E.2d 512 (1943); Dickson v. Young, 208
Iowa 1, 221 N.W. 820 (1928) ; Modla v. Miller, 344 Mich. 21, 73 N.W.2d 220 (1955) ;
Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 74 S.W.2d 805 (1934);
Wendel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 83 Mont. 252, 272 Pac. 245 (1928); Kersen-
brock v. Security State Bank, 120 Neb. 561, 234 N.W. 419 (1931) ; Kearney v. Mallon
Suburban Motors, Inc., 135 N.J.L. 457, 52 A.2d 692 (Ct Err. & App. 1947) ; Southern
Ice & Util. Co. v. Bench, 179 Okla. 50, 64 P.2d 668 (1937) ; Miller v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 371 Pa. 308, 89 A.2d 809 (1952); Brusco v. Morry, 54 R.I. 108, 170 Atl. 84
(1934) ; Freezer v. Miller, 163 Va. 180, 176 S.E. 159 (1934) ; Pallett v. Thompkins,
10 Wash. 2d 697, 118 P.2d 190 (1941) ; Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Southwest Fin. Co., 4 Cal.
App. 2d 326, 40 P2d 862 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (dictum) ; Fowler v. Ruebelmann,
65 Idaho 231, 142 P.2d 594 (1943) (dictum); Barnes v. Danner, 169 Kan. 32, 216
P.2d 804 (1950) (dictum); (Blue) Star Serv., Inc. v. McCurdy, 36 Tenn. App. 1,
251 S.W.2d 139 (1952) (dictum).
29. See Curley v. Automobile Fin. Co., 343 Pa. 280, 23 A.2d 48 (1941).
30. See id. at 286-87, 23 A.2d at 51-52 and authorities there cited.
31. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
32. See Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931).
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cases to the jury, nominally for a determination of credibility, some of the
harshness of the common law may be alleviated in individual and unusual
cases.P This, of course, is to recognize a desirable quality in the jury's
failure to follow the court's instructions on the law; that although the law
may not differentiate between widows and opulent corporate enterprises,
between blackguards and "sharps" and reasonable business entrepreneurs,
it is not in the interests of society that those operating barely within the
letter of the law be permitted to impose "unfair" burdens on others. Fur-
thermore, it may be thought desirable to provide a democratic means
whereby the popular will might have some expression in the face of
lagging judicial application of contemporary notions of justice. Nowhere
in court decisions is this attitude toward the jury's role so frankly reflected,
albeit negatively, than in the malicious prosecution cases. In that particular
cause of action, the courts believe that the interests of the state in preserving
the extant definition of the cause of action are too serious to permit any
legislative exercise by the jury.3 4
Even to assume the desirability of such a jury role in some cases,
however, is not to argue against imposing some limitation on the tremendous
freedom now permitted that body. There is no reason to believe that with
such a limitation the judiciary will not more aggressively mold traditional
legal concepts and create new ones to keep pace with the changing attitudes
of our society. For example, if the general success of negligence plaintiffs
with the jury is in part a popular expression that compensation should be
awarded where the law declares that it should not, it would seem more
fitting that the law should devise some more acceptable system, e.g., a doc-
trine of comparative negligence. Doctrines of duress and consideration in
the law of contracts may similarly demand revision and subdivision to more
properly give desired relief in extraordinary situations. It may be seriously
questioned whether, in terms of relative competence and realistic democratic
expression, this function may not more adequately be performed by center-
ing the entire responsibility on the judiciary. By attempting to compel the
proper legal result in those cases where the evidence demands it, the
harshness or undesirability of the substantive law would at least be impres-
sively emphasized on that law-giving department of our government.
Furthermore, it is submitted that picking and choosing among the various
causes of action and parties litigant impedes the progress of the development
of a new general procedure which will better balance the functions of judge
and jury to assure more adequate protection to other persons who are
equally deserving of the rights which the law presently provides.
33. See CARDozo, THE PARADOX OF LEGAL SCIENCE 41 (1928) ; Levin, Equitable
Cleaw-Up and the Jury, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 320, 341-43 (1951).
34. The procedure followed by some courts in medical malpractice actions might
be subjected to a similar analysis, i.e., the interests of the state in encouraging physi-
cians to develop their medical art are too important to permit the jury to impose
unwarranted liability. This has never been expressed in any of the opinions and may
well be criticized as unrealistic in this case.
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Uncontradicted ERidece
Some jurisdictions have applied a more general exception to the
"credibility" rule, providing that in any case where the evidence on the de-
terminative fact issue is uncontradicted and unimpeached, not inherently
improbable or suspicious for any other reason, the court shall withdraw the
case from the jury and direct the verdict thus indicated.35 In the terms
with which this doctrine is defined it is logically unassailable. To declare
that the jury should not be permitted to find testimony inaccurate in the
absence of any indications of inaccuracy is to state the obvious. The
question, however, is whether the court is capable of recognizing all the
valid indications of evidential untrustworthiness which might have been
credited by the jury. One assumption implicit in the orthodox procedural
doctrine is that the bases for a proper evaluation of credibility are as yet so
poorly established that there is more safety in reliance upon the collective
experience of a number of jurors, theoretically a cross-section of the com-
munity, than to entrust this determination to a single individual, the trial
judge. Indeed, the question of what are the manifestations of insincerity,
faulty memory, improper perception, or inability to accurately communicate
the information which the witness intends to convey has greatly perplexed
the profession. What one man accepts as a prime indication of untrust-
worthiness another rejects as meaningless. Scientific investigation in this
field has just begun, and the results of the limited experimentation which
35. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1931); Deitz v. Greyhound
Corp., 234 F2c 327 (5th Cir. 1956); Nicholas v. Davis, 204 F.2d 200 (10th Cir.
1953) ; Castagno v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 151 F. Supp. 78 (D. Utah 1957) ; Martin
v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Ariz. 403, 257 P2d 596 (1953) ; City of Tucson v. Apache
Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 245 P.2d 255 (1952) ; American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 70
Ariz. 78, 216 P.2d 413 (1950) ; Walters v. Bank of America, 110 Cal. 2d 46, 69 P.2d
839 (1937); Ritchie v. Long Beach Community Hosp. Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 688, 34
P.2d 771 (Dist. Ct. App. 1934) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 110-104 (1937), Davis v. Akuis,
85 Ga. App. 364, 69 S.E.2d 791 (1952); Williams v. Kelley, 78 Ga. App. 699, 51
S.E.2d 696 (1949) ; Fuller v. DePaul Univ., 293 Ill. App. 261, 12 N.E.2d 213 (1937) ;
Lister v. Donlan, 85 Mont. 571, 281 Pac. 348 (1929) ; Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins.
Co., 22 N.J. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956) ; Walsh v. Sisters of Charity, 47 Ohio App.
228, 191 N.E. 791 (1933); Webb v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 194 Okla. 30, 147 P.2d
169 (1944); Yellow Cab Operating Co. v. Robinson, 187 Okla. 669, 105 P.2d 535
(1940); Bourne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192 S.E. 605 (1937); Jerke v.
Delmont State Bank, 54 S.D. 446, 223 N.W. 585 (1929) ; Supreme Liberty Life Ins.
Co. v. Pemelton, 24 Tenn. App. 576, 148 S.W2d 1 (1940) ; Brown v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 111 Vt. 30, 11 A.2d 222 (1940); 9 WIGmoE, EVIDENCE 306 (3d ed. 1940) and
cases cited therein.
The prevailing authority on this question in Pennsylvania has been MacDonald
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944) (see text at note 7 supra),
which strongly affirmed the orthodox doctrine that the proponent's testimony must
always be submitted to the jury for determination of credibility. There is some indi-
cation, however, in the recent decision of Waters v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 393
Pa. 247, 144 A.2d 354 (1958), that this jurisdiction may be moving toward accept-
ance of the "uncontradicted evidence!' rule. The plaintiff in this case had success-
fully prosecuted a previous action against one Koch for injuries and wrongful death
resulting from a collision with an automobile owned by one Dreistadt. Koch was the
driver of the Dreistadt automobile. Plaintiff then brought this action against Drei-
stadt's insurer on the theory that the omnibus clause of the policy covered persons
operating the automobile with the owner's permission. The insurance company
denied liability on the ground that Koch had no permission to drive the automobile
at the time of the accident. This was the sole issue of the case. Plaintiff introduced
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has been performed indicate little more than the difficulty of the inquiry.3
However, the complexity of the task of determining credibility in most
cases need not preclude the existence of cases in which the danger of per-
mitting the trial judge to make the evaluation is so small as to make it the
more desirable procedure in view of the sometimes intransigent character of
the jury. Let us consider the cases so as to evaluate the rule in its practice.
In some of the cases the evidence which is considered to be conclusive
obviously relates to matters which are within the knowledge of the opposing
party.37 For example, in Brown v. Maryland Cas. Co. s the plaintiff
brought an action to recover indemnity from his insurer for the embezzle-
ment of goods by one of his employees. The plaintiff first discovered the
loss of his property on July 26 when an inventory of the goods entrusted to
this employee disclosed a shortage. The insurer, however, was not notified
of the loss until November 17, and it was argued by the defendant that the
failure to afford it notification within ten days of the discovery of the loss,
according to the terms of their contract, avoided its obligation to indemnify.
Under the substantive law, however, the insured was required to inform
the defendant only after he had "knowledge" of a loss under the policy,
not upon a mere "suspicion." 3 9 The determinative factual issue then was
when did the plaintiff discover that the loss was caused by the peculations
of the employee rather than from normal business inefficiency? Witnesses
called by defendant came forward to testify that inventories had been con-
no direct evidence on this point but relied on the presumption of permissive use arising
from proof of the insured's ownership. 393 Pa. at 250, 144 A.2d at 355. The de-
fendant then introduced evidence indicating that Dreistadt had entrusted the automobile
to the driver only to wax and polish it but with no authority to operate it, and the
plaintiff cross-examined, attempting to shake the credibility of these witnesses. The
trial court submitted the case to the jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff. On
appeal, the supreme court held that the effect of the presumption of permission raised
by proof of Dreistadt's ownership was "to require the defendant to come forward
with credible evidence. The burden of persuasion on the issue of permission of the
driver of the automobile remains with the plaintiff. . . . Therefore, when the de-
fendant assumes his burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue of per-
mission and presents evidence clearly indicatinji that n permisrsion was granted so
that a jury coidd not reasotably find otherwise, then if the plaintiff fails to produce
evidence that permission had been granted, the court shoudd direct a verdict for the
defendant." (Citing no cases.) 393 Pa. at 253, 144 A.2d at 357. (Emphasis
added.) The court considered that in this case sufficient conflicts in the testimony
of defendant's witnesses had been adduced by plaintiff's cross-examination to require
the submission of the case to the jury. "The court may not direct a verdict for the
defendant in such a case because the jury must have the opportunity to resolve the
conflicts in the testimony of defendant's witnesses." 393 Pa. at 253 n.5, 144 A.2d at 357
n.5. (Emphasis added.) The court then cited MacDmald only for the proposition that
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff may be set aside if the judge is satisfied that it
represents a "caprious disregard of the evidence." Because of error in the trial
court's charge to the jury, the majority ruled to reverse the judgment and order
a new trial. Two justices, however, noted (without opinion) that they would enter
judgment n.o.v.
36. See Levin, Evidence and the Behavioral Sciences (U. Pa. Law School, Insti-
tute of Legal Research, 1956) (mimeo.).
37. E.g., Walters v. Bank of America, 110 Cal. 2d 46, 49 P.2d 839 (1937);
Davis v. Akins, 85 Ga. App. 364, 69 S.E.2d 791 (1952); Webb v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 194 Okla. 30, 147 P.2d 169 (1944); Bourne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 185 S.C. 1,
192 S.E. 605 (1937).
38. 111 Vt. 30, 11 A.2d 222 (1940).
39. 111 Vt. at 34, 11 A.2d at 224.
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ducted after July 26-on September 30 and on November 15. The insur-
ance broker who had written the policy for plaintiff testified that the insured
had called on him in the latter part of October and informed the broker that
an employee was short in his inventory by a substantial amount and that
the plaintiff was desirous of having either the employee or the defendant
make good the loss. The plaintiff failed to dispute any of this evidence.
Holding that "this testimony was direct and positive, and uncontradicted
by cross-examination or by other testimony, facts or circumstances,"
clearly indicating that the plaintiff had knowledge of the insurable loss
more than ten days before notifying the surety, the Supreme Court of
Vermont reversed the judgment for plaintiff rendered by the jury in the
court below, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for de-
fendant.40 Of course, in terms of strict burdens of proof plaintiff had no
obligation to come forward with evidence which related solely to the defense.
On the other hand, as the matter concerned plaintiff's own personal history
so that its truth or falsity could not have been without his knowledge, the
apparent admission indicated by silence in the face of such testimony is
difficult to gainsay. It does not make sense in such a situation to say that
the jury may reject the evidence when the plaintiff himself has made no
attempt to encourage such a finding while the means to do so were neces-
sarily available to him.
On the other hand, there are cases in which the accessibility of con-
tradicting evidence is not so clearly available to the challenged party. For
example, the transaction involved may not have been one in which the party
was personally involved and the only known witnesses are adverse. In
such a situation the litigant's only course can be to rely upon the jury's
rejection of this unfavorable testimony as untrustworthy. Even here,
however, there may be substantial justice in withdrawing the case from the
jury. In Deits v. Greyhound Corp.,41 for example, the plaintiff brought an
action for wrongful death caused by the negligence of defendant's bus driver.
Sufficient evidence of negligence was introduced by the testimony of the bus
driver himself and a witness who claimed to have seen part of the trans-
action. The only evidence of contributory negligence, however, was the
testimony of a number of bus passengers who related facts which, if true,
would have precluded recovery. There was no indication that these persons
were not in a position to adequately observe the occurrence, nor did they
appear to have any interest in the outcome of the litigation. Their evidence
was not circumstantial, so that varying inferences might be drawn from it,
but direct as to the conduct of the plaintiff's decedent, so that it was neces-
sary to have accepted or rejected it in its entirety. Yet clearly the plaintiff
was not in a position to come forward with evidence which might serve as
a basis for disbelief of the opposing witnesses. Nonetheless, the court
directed the verdict for defendant.
40. 111 Vt. at 35, 11 A.2d at 225.
41. 234 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1956).
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The question was simply whether it was more desirable to conclude
the controversy on the basis of the substantial evidence which had been
introduced or to permit the jury to return a speculative judgment as to
the credibility of these witnesses based on no evidence at all. It is one thing
to say that the indicia which truly reflect testimonial accuracy are not yet
subject to articulate and supportable definition, but another to conclude
that it is impossible to recognize a complete absence of any such indicia
which even some responsible persons might consider probative. The major
difficulty encountered in the determination of credibility is the question of
value to be attributed to such factors as evidence of darkness at the time of
the testified observance, age or youth of the witness, interest in the outcome
of the litigation, etc. Some persons may believe that a witness who has
a record of a past conviction of a felony is to be absolutely distrusted; an-
other considers such evidence absolutely irrelevant to credibility. Similarly
some may believe that observance of an occurrence from a distance of more
than two hundred feet is so subject to inaccuracy as not to be worthy of
consideration; others have greater or less respect for the capabilities of
human faculties. This matter, however, goes to the question of what
inference should be drawn from certain basic evidence. Where there is
some logical relation between the inferable and the evidence, courts tradi-
tionally submit the question to the jury. Where there are no facts which
might reasonably tend to indicate a necessary fact conclusion, the jury is not
permitted to act. This is the basis for the orthodox nonsuit or directed
verdict against the proponent of the evidence. 42  Why then could we not
demand a "prima fade case" of incredibility before we permit the jury to
summarily reject testimony?
There do not appear to be compelling reasons why even demeanor evi-
dence might not be made subject to identical judicial scrutiny, recognizing
that it alone may afford some basis for a determination of witness un-
reliability. Assuming that such emotional manifestations as nervousness,
hesitancy in testifying, blushing, anger, and the like may have some relevance
to the question of testimonial accuracy, the notion does not preclude the
existence of cases in which no significant untoward appearances are pre-
sented by the witnesses. It is not necessary that the judge determine what
particular conduct he personally believes to be fairly indicative on the
question, but only that there were no signs which are commonly given any
credit one way or the other by responsible persons. Unfortunately, al-
though many of the cases refer to "circumstances which might cause the
uncontradicted testimony to be regarded with suspicion," no opinion has
offered an adequate discussion of the effect of demeanor evidence in the
case. There is no reason to believe, however, that should counsel articu-
lately point to any unusual or suspicious conduct on the part of the witnesses
42. 9 WIGmoRE, EviDENcE § 2495 (3d ed. 1940) ; Smith, The Power of the Judge
To Direct a Verdict: Section 457-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, 24 COLUm.
L. REv. 111, 117 (1924).
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which might have properly been considered by the jury, a directed verdict
would not have been held improper. Not infrequently there are other
circumstances in a case which tend to cast suspicion on particular testimony,
and the courts have readily given them proper consideration in determining
the conclusive character of otherwise uncontradicted evidence. 43  In
Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co.,44 for example, the plaintiff had brought
an action against his insurer for indemnity for the alleged theft of some
jewelry and other belongings from his parked automobile. The plaintiff and
his wife testified that they had left jewelry in their automobile overnight
and that when they returned to it, they found a window broken, the contents
of the automobile in a state of disarray and all the valuable pieces of jewelry
gone. The defendant offered no evidence at all. The trial court then
directed a plaintiff's verdict. On appeal, reversing the judgment and re-
manding for new trial, it was held that although uncontradicted evidence
even of an interested party may provide the basis for a directed verdict, the
testimony must not be such as to give "too many pauses to the reasoning
process" because of its inherent improbability or extraordinary character.
45
One significant circumstance here which peculiarly cast suspicion on plain-
tiff's case was the fact that only the valuable jewelry was allegedly stolen
while the "thief" selectively passed over items of costume jewelry in the
same packages.
THE NEw TRIAL STANDARD
Some jurisdictions have moved to the position that whether there be
contradictory evidence or not, should the evidence on one side of the con-
troversy be so "overwhelming" as to leave no reasonable doubt as to what
were the actual facts, the court is authorized to direct the verdict.46 In
43. See Bobbe, The Uwontradicted Testimony of an Interested Witnwss, 20
CoaiwEL L.Q. 33 (1934); Note, 8 A.L.R. 769 (1920).
44. 22 NJ. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956).
45. 22 N.J. at 499, 126 A.2d at 333.
46. Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332 (1942) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamber-
lain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933); Southern Ry. v. Walters, 284 U.S. 190 (1931); Murray v.
Towers, 239 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1956); McVeary v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 87 F.2d
963 (5th Cir. 1937); J. D. Halstead Lumber Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co.,
38 Ariz. 228, 298 Pac. 925 (1931) ; In re Snift's Estate, 233 Iowa 800, 10 N.W.2d
550 (1943) ; Potter v. Robinson, 233 Iowa 479, 9 N.W.Zd 457 (1943) ; Lee v. Lee,
248 Minn. 496, 80 N.W.2d 529 (1957); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Motive Power Im-
plement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W2d 688 (1956); Forde v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
241 Minn. 246, 63 N.W.2d 11 (1954) ; Kath v. Kath, 238 Minn. 120, 55 N.W2d 691
(1952) ; Hanson v. Homeland Ins. Co., 232 Minn. 403, 45 N.W.2d 637 (1951) ; Grover
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 Vt. 246, 125 A.2d 571 (1956) ; Spaulding v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 94 Vt. 42, 109 Atl. 22 (1920) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-352 (1957) ;
Braswell v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 162 Va. 27, 173 S.E. 365 (1934) ; Flannagan
v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Va. 38, 146 S.E. 353 (1929).
New York at one time numbered among these jurisdictions with the adoption of
§ 457-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1921, ch. 372, reading:
"The judge may direct a verdict when he would set aside a contrary verdict as against
the weight of the evidence." Section 457-a has now been amended to read: "The
court may direct a verdict when it would be required to set aside a contrary verdict
for legal insufficiency of evidence." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 457-a.
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doctrinal terms this procedure is tied to the recognized standard for another
and dissimilar device, long recognized by the common-law courts. In these
jurisdictions it is held that whenever the balance of the evidence is such
that the trial judge would feel compelled to order a new trial in the face of
a particular verdict, he should immediately determine the controversy. The
theory of this doctrine is that when considering the trial presentation as a
whole there may be so much reason to doubt the evidence of one party and
so little reason to disbelieve the opposing evidence that reasonable men could
come to but a single conclusion, and the court will not then permit the jury
to return a verdict which so strongly offends the court's sense of justice. In
Potter v. Robinson,4 7 for example, the plaintiff brought an action for
wrongful death, alleging that one of defendant's drivers had negligently
driven his truck so as to cross the highway center-line onto the east side and
there collided with the decedent's automobile. The only surviving persons
who observed the accident were members of the defendant's truck caravan
who testified that the collision took place on their side of the road. They
said that a pile of broken glass and dirt was found on that side of the pave-
ment and that there were tire skid marks leading from it to the resting
places of both the decedent's automobile and the truck. The local sheriff,
his deputy and three other persons, unrelated and previously unknown to
the parties, who arrived at the scene soon after the accident, gave identical
testimony as to the appearance of the skid marks and the debris. Photo-
graphs taken at that time also showed these conditions and were introduced
into evidence. One person testified for the plaintiff to the effect that he had
arrived at the scene some time after the incident and that the debris and
tire marks appeared to him to be on the east side of the highway. This
witness also testified that it was dark at the time, that he did not have a
flashlight and that he "didn't look around much that night." A lawyer who
had been retained by the plaintiff to investigate the case testified that the
defendant (who had not personally observed the collision) had admitted
to him that the accident was caused by his driver's having crossed the
center-line. This the defendant denied. The court directed the verdict
for defendant. Affirming on appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa, analyzing
the evidence, held that except for the plaintiff's single witness all the wit-
nesses unanimously agreed that the tire marks made by both vehicles clearly
indicated that the point of impact was on the west side of the highway and
that the "uncertain and equivocal testimony" of the opposing witness was
insufficient "to raise a conflict." 48 Furthermore, the probative value of an
admission made by a party some time after the accident, and which
was not even purportedly based on personal observation, was too slight a
reed to cast genuine doubt on the facts as represented by defendant. Should
the jury have returned a verdict for plaintiff it would have been so greatly
contrary to the weight of the evidence that it could not have been permitted
47. 233 Iowa 479, 9 N.W2d 457 (1943).
48. 233 Iowa at 487, 9 N.W.2d at 461.
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to stand, but defendant would have been entitled to a new trial. Under
such circumstances the court should direct the verdict and conclude the
controversy.49
Cases such as these argue strongly for the procedure applied by the
court. Although the evidence might be said to be "contradictory" in the
sense that there was variant testimony introduced which, considered sepa-
rately, might indicate conflicting conclusions, evaluated as a whole there is
little doubt as to how rational persons would react in making a similar
decision concerning their own personal business affairs in the face of a like
presentation. The mere fact that both sides introduce some evidence relat-
ing to the same ultimate fact and tending to indicate contrary conclusions,
one being of relatively tenuous probative relevance and the other being clear
and direct, should not be sufficient in every case to raise a reasonable issue
as to credibility. Certainly in extreme cases the dangers inherent in a
judicial determination of this question rather than in a jury determination
are no greater than presented by cases of absolutely uncontradicted evi-
dence, and fairness to the parties may call for a similar procedure.5 0 How-
ever, by relating the inquiry to the standard designed for granting a new
trial too sweeping a cure for the evil may be effected, including within the
scope of the rule cases in which the dangers of jury consideration are not
out-balanced by the benefits which may be obtained from it.
One notion which seems to underly the orthodox tradition of submitting
questions of credibility to the jury is that a not insignificant factor in the
evaluation of testimony is the trier's attitude toward the reliability of the
type of person he believes the witness to be. Most of us, for example,
would tend to reject out of hand the testimony of a "bum-in-the-park"
when contradicted by a respectable member of the clergy. Our attitudes
are in part molded by personal experience with a variety of persons and in
part by social prejudices instilled in us by parents, teachers and associates.
When determining the credibility of a witness, members of the bench are
no less affected by their own upbringing and background of experience
than others, while the varying social predispositions of the jury are some-
what neutralized by the collectivity of their decisional process. To illustrate
this aspect of the problem let us consider the case of Bank of United States
v. Manheim. 1
This was an action brought by the plaintiff bank against the endorser
of a note payable to the bank. The defense interposed was the bank's oral
agreement with the principal debtor to cancel the obligation upon the
debtor's assignment of his assets to the bank. The defendant and his son-
in-law testified to the occurrence of the transaction. The plaintiff's officers,
on the other hand, denied any such agreement and introduced evidence to
show that the defendant had not requested formal cancellation of the note
49. 233 Iowa at 490, 9 N.W2d at 462.
50. See text and notes accompanying notes 41-45 mtpra.
51. 264 N.Y. 45, 189 N.E. 776 (1934).
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prior to five months after the alleged renunciation, while during this time
the debtor was on the verge of bankruptcy and the defendant was solvent.
Emphasizing this latter bit of evidence, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the direction of a verdict for plaintiff, holding that "a verdict for
the defendant, if rendered by a jury on such testimony would necessarily
have to be set aside." 5 2 Little quarrel could be had with the court's decision
that the weight of the evidence supported the bank's position. The defend-
ant was not unversed in the ways of financial transactions so that he would
not recognize the significance of permitting his written obligations to remain
uncancelled, the dealings took place during the time of the great depression
when businessmen were fighting desperately for their economic lives, and
defendant's testimony as well as that of his only other witness were subject
to severe suspicion on the ground of obvious personal interest. The plain-
tiff's officers, on the other hand, a generally respectable class of persons,
were not so subject to the pressures of personal interest, and the seeming
irregularity of the alleged transaction lends a substantial degree of credence
to their testimony. However, the opposing testimony was all direct as to
the ultimate facts in dispute; one set of evidence could not be accepted
without absolute rejection of the other as untrue. Although the defendant's
conduct was perhaps foolish and unusual, his testimony was not necessarily
incredible. Individual members of the jury might well have drawn on their
own personal experience and background and found far more likelihood of
accuracy in this testimony than did the court. The very real contribution
which the jury may afford in this regard, both for the purposes of obtaining
fair and accurate judicial relief and of retaining the democratic flavor of
common-law litigation, would seem to be too valuable to be lost. But while
the course of the trial may not have been such as to properly call for the
final determination of the rights of the parties by the court without the
opinion of the jury, the case at the same time is a classic one for the grant-
ing of a new trial. Thus the different functions which that device and the
directed verdict are designed to perform and the inadvisability of tying the
operation of the one to the other are sharply illustrated.
The motion for new trial because the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence is not a procedure intended to authorize the court to frustrate
the entry of the verdict returned by the jury, but for use in cases where,
the evidence having been peculiarly unbalanced, fairness and efficiency sug-
gest the desirability of having another consideration of the case by a
fresh jury panelP3 To grant such a motion there need be much less than
conviction on the part of the court that the verdict rendered was improper
or unreasonable, but only a determination that the weight of the evidence
appears to so strongly point toward a contrary finding that there is a
significant likelihood that the present jury was either aberrational in per-
52. 264 N.Y. at 51, 189 N.E. at 778. Since the time of this decision the legislature
has abandoned this standard for directing a verdict. See note 46 supra.
53. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 400 n.9 (1943) (dissenting
opinion) ; 9 WGmoRE EvmENcE 298-99 (3d ed. 1940).
1958] THE COURT'S POWER TO DETERMINE CREDIBILITY 235
sonality or its members were attempting to legislate a legal result in dis-
regard of their honest opinion of the evidence. The level of persuasiveness
of a party's evidence which is necessary to permit him another opportunity
to convince a jury may be quite disparate from that which should be neces-
sary to lead the court to a conclusion of absolute injustice in a verdict which
is unfavorable to him. Nor does it follow that to refuse the court authority
to enter a final judgment where it would not permit an initial jury verdict
to stand is to "relegate the parties to a contest of endurance," as it has been
characterized by some advocates of this standard for a directed verdict.54
In several jurisdictions the legislatures have established limitations on the
number of successive re-trials which may be ordered in a single action; 5
others achieve a similar result by judicial self-restraint.5 6 At some point
judicial evaluation must give way and the court recognize the fallibility of
its own determination. This new trial device is designed basically to afford
an adequate opportunity to the parties to present their cases to a fair and
honest jury panel, not a medieval method of insuring that the court's con-
clusion as to facts will finally succeed.57
To recognize the value of retaining jury consideration of cases where
the evidence realistically reflects an actual factual dispute, however, treats
only half the problem. The new trial procedure is admittedly wasteful and
cumbersome, and efforts should be made to keep the jury within the bounds
of their authority in the initial trial and to encourage them to render verdicts
based on their honest opinion of the evidence and faithful to the court's
charge on the law. One aid in this regard might be a grant of more liberal
authority for the court to comment on the evidence.58 While not anticipat-
ing that the court could or should dissuade jurors from their own convic-
tions, where a particular verdict appears unwarranted and unrealistic to the
judge, his discussion of that fact may impress upon them their responsibility
and make some less ready to subvert their honest opinions and join in a
verdict designed to afford relief which is contrary to the law. It might
also be politic to inform the jury of the court's power to grant a new trial
in the face of an unreasonable verdict. It is hardly suggested that the
triers of fact be threatened with judicial rejection of their verdict, but a jury
made aware of the procedures which are available to render their decision
ineffectual might well be further encouraged to follow the court's instruc-
tions on the law. Another device which may prove helpful would be in-
54. Smith, The Power of the Judge To Direct a Verdict: Section 457-a of the
New York Civil Practice Act, 24 CoLum. L. REv. 111, 122 (1924).
55. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7. §277 (1941); Aniz. R. Civ. P. 59(k); Miss. CoDE
ANN. § 1536 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. 510.330 (1952); OHIo Rzv. CODE ANN.
§ 2321.18 (1954) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-202 (1955) ; VA. CODE ANN § 8-224 (1957);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5662 (1955).
56. E.g., Gutman v. Weisbath, 194 App. Div. 351, 185 N.Y. Supp. 261 (1920),
57. This is not to ignore the fact that some courts have made such use of the
new trial procedure, although it would seem improper. See, e.g., Meinreuken v. New
York Cent. R.R., 103 App. Div. 319, 92 N.Y. Supp. 1015 (1905), which affirmed the
setting aside of the jury's verdict for the fourth timeI
58. See Note, 27 N.D.L. Ray. 199 (1927).
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creased use of special findings instead of the general verdict. Here again,
there is some likelihood that a person might be more amenable to sub-
merging his honest opinion of the factual matters involved in a general
verdict for one party or the other than were he forced to be counted as
finding a particular detailed fact against which his reason rebelled. It is
noted that in the malicious prosecution cases, in which the courts have been
exceptionally zealous in their efforts to insure that relief is afforded only
where the law demands, this procedure has been encouraged for use in
those cases where the verdict may not be directed.59 As previously dis-
cussed, the substantive law of this cause of action frequently provides that
the court shall determine the factual question of probable cause only when
the evidence is uncontradicted and unimpeached. When the facts of which
the private prosecutor had knowledge and which induced him to prefer
charges against the plaintiff are disputed by conflicting evidence, the ques-
tion must be submitted to the jury. Some courts,6 ' and the Restatement
of Torts,2 have recommended that the issue be tendered in the form of
specific interrogatories, presumably under the theory that this procedure
will aid in focusing the jury's attention on the specific factual matters
whereas a request for a general verdict may tend to encourage considera-
tion of the policy question of whether there ought to be compensation for
the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
It would seem that an absolute rule requiring the submission of the
question of credibility to the jury is neither a desirable procedure for the
resolution of all civil cases nor one faithfully and consistently applied by the
courts in any jurisdiction. The limitations of both the judiciary and the
jury are such that maximum benefits of the qualities that each may offer
to the process of fact determination may more efficiently be obtained with
greater fairness to the parties by some flexibility in the traditional doc-
trinaire roles assigned to them. Yet few courts--or legislatures-have
undertaken an over-all evaluation of their procedural rules in this regard,
contenting themselves with the creation of unrelated and sporadic exceptions
to the orthodox doctrine for application in cases which particularly appeal
to them. The few jurisdictions which have attempted the formulation of
some more general rule may well have devised a cure too drastic for the evil
involved. It is suggested that perhaps the solution may not properly lie
in the establishment of definitive rules but in providing a procedure which
relies in greater measure on the discretion of the trial judge. We might
59. See, e.g., Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F2d 595, 601 (3d Cir. 1958);
Biggans v. Hajoca Corp., 185 F.2d 982, 983 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Simpson v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 354 Pa. 87, 96-97, 46 A2d 674, 680 (1946).
60. See text and note accompanying note 28 supra.
61. See note 59 supra.
62. RESTATEWEwT, TORTS § 673, comment d (1938).
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authorize the court to direct a verdict when the evidence presented by one
party is of peculiarly persuasive character, there being no basis in the court-
room presentation for regarding it with suspicion or doubt, and the accept-
ance of such evidence would not a fortiori denand the rejection of the other
party's evidence. This situation might come about as well in the case of
uncontradicted direct evidence as where the opposing evidence is of a low
order of circumstantiality so that the testimony of the opposing witnesses
need not be regarded as inaccurate but merely not indicative of some fact
which would have otherwise been inferable. Such a doctrine approaches
that applied by the most "liberal" jurisdictions, but may have the advantage
of not encompassing the whole range of situations in which a new trial
might properly be ordered but which are not meet for final judicial
determination.
D.B.
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THE USE OF CHAPTER X REORGANIZATIONS TO
INCREASE INFORMED SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPA-
TION IN REORGANIZED CORPORATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The first goal of a corporate reorganization is said to be "the produc-
tion of a sound economic unit . . . able to operate its business successfully
and pay a reasonable return to those having interest in it." I In reaching
this goal, the first objective might be a recapitalization of the corporation's
existing economic structure. However, in many instances recapitalization
alone will not be sufficient, for the reason behind a corporation's financial
distress may be directly attributable to its management.2 Mismanagement
is readily ascertainable in some instances,3 while in many others it lies
hidden beneath other alleged reasons for a corporation's financial difficul-
ties.4 The likelihood of its existence makes a second reorganization
objective appear desirable-a shifting of the corporation's management and
control. This process might be called "recontrolization."
Recontrolization through reorganization can serve two separate func-
tions. First, it may serve to replace an old management responsible for
much of the corporation's difficulty with a new and more competent
management.5 Second, it may serve to re-allocate the power to control the
corporation through a distribution of voting rights to a new group of
1. Gerdes, General Priwiples of Plais of Corporate Reorganization, 89 U. PA.
L. REv. 39, 41 (1940).
2. See, e.g., McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 8 S.E.C. 853, 855 (1941); Deep Rock
Oil Corp., 7 S.E.C. 174, 177 (1940) ; 1 SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION
OF TEE WoR, AcrrviniEs, PERSONNEL AND FuNcTIONS OF PROTECrrVE AND REORGANI-
ZATION COMMITTEES 2-3 (1937) (hereinafter cited as SEC STUDY). The desire to
change management may also stem from reasons other than ineffectiveness. For
example, new management may be needed because a holding company is being broken
up, or because existing management has conflicting interests, or to interest new groups
in the enterprise. 2 GERES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 1652-53 (1936).
3. See, e.g., McKesson & Robbins, Inc., supra note 2, at 855, where the corpo-
ration's difficulties were said to be largely due to the president's fraudulent activity.
4. See JEREMIAH, CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF CORPORATE BOND DEFAULT (1936),
where the author made a detailed analysis of reasons given for bond defaults by
eighty-six corporations. Insurable calamities, decreases in sales due to causes other
than changes in demand, delay in collecting outstanding accounts, excessive inventory,
excessive trade liabilities, high operating or production cost due to managament, high
royalties payable, inadequate maintenance of property, overcapitalization, payment of
high prices for property, strikes when position of management cannot be justified,
and underfinancing are among the alleged reasons for bond default given. The author
concludes that the above reasons are the direct results of ineffective management.
Id. at 89-90.
5. Reorganization affords "a rare and signal opportunity for dislodging a manage-
ment," 1 SEC STUDY 309 (1937), whereas such a task might have proved extremely
difficult, if not impossible, had the corporation not gone through reorganization pro-
ceedings.
(238)
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shareholders 6 and to increase the realization of this potential to control by
the adoption of measures increasing informed shareholder participation in
the governmental processes of the corporation.
7
Informed shareholder participation is used in the limited sense of
allowing the shareholder to take an active interest in determining broad
policy affairs of the corporation and providing him with access to the in-
formation necessary for intelligent use of voting power. It does not mean
that the board of directors should be abolished, allowing the shareholders,
acting as in a simple political democracy, to take over the daily affairs of
the corporation and reach decisions in a "town-meeting" type procedure. 8
However, it does mean that shareholders will have indirect control over
these daily affairs by the power to elect directors who will be sensitive to
shareholder desires because of a realistic threat of removal from office.
It is the purpose of this Note to determine and evaluate what measures
of informed shareholder participation need be included in reorganization
plans to meet Security and Exchange Commission and reorganization court
standards of approval. A further attempt will be made to explore the
question of what additional measures leading to an ideal system of share-
holder participation might be adopted within the framework of existing
statutory provisions. This will be done with a view toward those special
problems that might be posed by a reorganization situation, and a further
consideration of whether federal intervention in this field may be justified
under the bankruptcy powers, as, for instance, on the ground that a reason-
able relationship between informed shareholder participation and the likeli-
hood of corporate financial stability may be found to exist.
CHAPTER X PROVISIONS GOVERNING FORMS
OF MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Judicial examination into forms of management and control first came
to have importance under the old section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act,9
the statutory forerunner of the present chapter X.10 Section 77B (f) (1)
required that a plan of reorganization be fair, equitable and feasible.-'
6. See, e.g., Inland Gas Corp., 29 S.E.C. 377, 400 (1949), where the Inland
trustee's plan provided that secured claimants were to receive bonds and class A
shares in exchange for their secured claims. Thus there occurred a change-in voting
power, since class A shares could elect four out of five directors.
7. This subject has also been labelled "shareholder democracy," "corporate
democracy," and occasionally "shareholder revolution."
8. See Garrett, Attitudes on Corporate Democracy--A Critical Analysis, 51 Nw.
U.L. REv. 310, 311 (1956). "[A]n attempt to equate stock ownership with political
citizenship may lead to conclusions dangerous for the future of American corporate
enterprise. Important as it is to develop measures to insure the responsiveness of
management to the interests of shareholders of modem publicly-held corporations, it
is even more important that they be efficiently managed. They cannot be efficiently
managed by the shareholders collectively. . . ." Id. at 310.
9. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911.
10. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. }§501-676 (1952) (Bankruptcy
Act §§ 101-276) (hereinafter cited by U.S.C. section only).
11. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B(f) (1), 48 Stat. 919.
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Under this provision the qualifications of men proposed for the management
of reorganized corporations, as well as the broader questions of where con-
trol over such corporations should reside, properly became the subject of
judicial attention in a number of cases. 2 Thus, the courts inquired into the
necessity and appropriateness of voting trusteeships and into the fairness
generally of the allocation of voting power among different classes of
security holders.13 Appropriate judicial scrutiny on these issues, however,
occurred only infrequently, and no pervasive reform could be attributed to
section 77B. 14 A more specific approach to problems of management and
control was instituted by chapter X. In addition to the broad requirement
of section 221(2), carried over from 77B, that a plan be fair, equitable
and feasible, 1 the courts are now directed by explicit mandate to make
inquiries into certain particular matters of management and control.
Section 216(11) 1 of chapter X governs the selection of directors,
officers or voting trustees. It provides that a plan of reorganization:
"shall include provisions which are equitable, compatible with the in-
terests of creditors and stockholders, and consistent with public policy,
with respect to the manner of selection of the persons who are to be
directors, officers, or voting trustees, if any, upon the consummation of
the plan, and their respective successors."
Requirements for inclusion of certain provisions in the reorganized cor-
poration's charter are set out in section 216(12). 17 This section requires
the inclusion of:
"(a) provisions prohibiting the debtor or such corporation from issu-
ing non-voting stock, and providing, as to the several classes of secu-
rities of the debtor or of such corporation possessing voting power,
for the fair and equitable distribution of such power among such
classes, including, in the case of any class of stock having a preference
over other stock with respect to dividends, adequate provisions for the
election of directors representing such preferred class in the event of
default in the payment of such dividends. .... "
Subsection (b) (2) of this section further requires that a corporation's
charter provide for periodic reports to security holders, including profit
and loss statements and balance sheets.'
8
12. 8 SEC STUDY 158 (1940).
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 158-59.
15. 11 U.S.C. §621(2) (1952).
16. 11 U.S.C. §616(11) (1952).
17. 11 U.S.C. §616(12) (a) (1952).
18. This requirement is somewhat limited. The reports need only be made
annually, and then are limited to cases where the indebtedness, liquidated as to amount
and not contingent as to liability, is $250,000 or over. 11 U.S.C. § 616(12) (b) (2)
(1952). The information required seems to be related only to past and present economic
status of the corporation, not to future plans and policies.
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Omnibus "catch-all' authority is afforded by the broad language of
section 216(14), which provides that a plan "may include any other appro-
priate provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter." 19
This section might be used as a basis for voluntary inclusion in the plan
of forms of management and control which would foster informed share-
holder participation. This is especially true since it is permissible to amend
the corporation's charter to provide adequate means for the execution of the
plan.20 At the same time, it appears to give the courts an additional foot-
hold in their power to strike down undesirable management and control
provisions by a determination that they are inconsistent with the provisions
of chapter X. However, this section has never been used in this context.
An alleged fault of the broad provisions of 77B was the court's lack of
concern with the identity of the personnel constituting the new management,
though it had power to make such inquiry.21 Judicial scrutiny in this area
is now mandatory under section 221(5).22 This section provides that the
judge shall confirm a plan if satisfied that:
"(5) . . . the identity, qualifications, and affiliations of the per-
sons who are to be directors or officers, or voting trustees, if any, upon
the consummation of the plan, have been fully disclosed, and that the
appointment of such persons to such offices, or their continuance
therein, is equitable, compatible with the interests of the creditors and
stockholders and consistent with public policy."
An additional provision that may have a bearing on types of manage-
ment and control is section 172.P This section provides that in certain
cases the judge shall,24 and in others may,2 5 submit plans worthy of con-
sideration to the SEC for examination and report.L2 6 Although the SEC's
report is advisory only,27 in making these reports it "has striven to obtain
the inclusion of various provisions in these instruments which will assure to
the investors a maximum of protection, adequate information with regard
to the enterprise, and a fair voice in the management. ,, 28
DisTRIBUTION OF THE POWER To CONTROL
Allocation of Voting Rights
The starting point of any system of shareholder participation will lie
in a determination, through allocation of voting rights, of what classes of
19. 11 U.S.C. § 616(14) (1952).
20. 11 U.S.C. §616(1) (1952).
21. 8 SEC STUDY 158-59 (1940).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 621(5) (1952).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1952).
24. If the scheduled indebtedness of the debtor exceeds $3,000,000. Ibid.
25. If the scheduled indebtedness of the debtor does not exceed $3,000,000. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. 10TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 150
(1944).
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securities will have power to control the corporation. A literal reading of
chapter X reveals only a partial standard of allocation. Although section
216(12) requires that once the classes to have voting power are determined,
there must be a "fair and equitable distribution of such power among such
classes," nothing is said concerning how the initial determination of what
classes will have voting rights is to be made.29 A corporate governing
system emphasizing informed shareholder participation would seem to
require the same "fair and equitable" standard when the reorganization
court reviews a plan making this initial determination.
In an economically sound corporation, the greatest risk-bearer will
generally have the greatest power to control. Thus, voting power will be
vested largely in the common shareholders,.0 with bondholders having few
or no voting rights.31 Between the two extremes would fall preferred
shareholders.3 2 But even in an economically sound corporation, it may be
desirable to shift this distribution upon the occurrence of certain contin-
gencies. Voting power might be granted to bondholders upon default or
some other stipulated occurrence threatening their position,3m or to preferred
shareholders when their position is jeopardized by an event such as a
dividend default.8 4 For the most part, when dealing with reorganized cor-
porations these same principles would be applicable, for it is contemplated
that a corporation will emerge from reorganization with an economically
sound capital structure.
8 5
A reorganization plan granting contingent voting rights to preferred
shareholders poses little legal difficulty since such a provision is specifically
required by section 216(12).36 The statute lays down the broad standard
that such provisions be "adequate." Since a mere grant of some voting
rights may prove only an illusory protection,3 7 most reorganization plans
have granted the preferred shares, upon default, either sole voting power,38
or power to elect a majority of directors voting as a class.8 9
29. 11 U.S.C. §616(12) (1952).
30. See BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINArcE 45 (1928): "Com-
mon shareholders . . . have a direct interest in every corporate operation; their
major hope of return lies in faithful and effective management. .. ."
31. The bondholders' interest in power to control is limited by the fact that they
have secured to themselves, by mortgage or enforceable action at law, a set of inde-
pendent controls on the corporation. Id. at 27, 45. Thus, the bondholders' interests
are not nearly so dependent upon management as are those of the common shareholders.
32. Id. at 45. The interest of preferred shareholders in management should vary
in proportion to the amount of contractual protection accorded them.
33. E.g., a diminution of earnings or working capital below a certain point. See
RoHRicH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BusiNEss ENTERPRI5SE 244 (1949).
34. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 419 (rev. ed. 1946).
35. Indeed, this is the very essence of the requirement of §221(2), 11 U.S.C.
§ 621(2) (1952), that a reorganization plan be "feasible." See, e.g., Central States
Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 340 U.S. 917 (1950).
36. 11 U.S.C. §616(12) (1952).
37. See BALLANTINE, CORFORATIONs 419 (rev. ed. 1946).
38. See, e.g., Penn Timber Co., 17 S.E.C. 107 (1944).
39. Childs Co., 26 S.E.C. 362 (1947) (preferred shareholders could elect majority
of directors plus one if four quarterly dividends missed or sinking fund payment
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In some cases preferred shareholders have not been limited to con-
tingent voting rights, but have been granted full rights, amounting in one
case to 36.7 per cent of the corporation's total vote.4° Although it may be
proper and desirable in some instances for the SEC and reorganization
courts to approve plans granting preferred shareholders non-contingent
voting rights,41 this approval should be granted cautiously, with recognition
that a voice in management is generally of a lesser interest to preferred
shareholders than it is to common shareholders. 42 Thus, preferred voting
rights should be limited generally to minority power.43 This would seem
to satisfy the requirement that a distribution of voting power among the
securities selected be fair and equitable."
In contrast to preferred shares, the statute makes no specific provision
for granting contingent voting rights to bondholders. Such provisions might
be fostered by the courts under the broad language of section 216(11) 
4 5
requiring "equitable" provisions with respect to the manner in which
directors are elected, or under the general requirement of section 221(2) 46
that any plan be "fair and equitable." Section 216(14),47 which allows
"any other appropriate provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of
this chapter," might be used by the reorganization committee as a basis for
the inclusion of such a provision in reorganization plans.
Although it may prove desirable to grant bondholders at least con-
tingent voting rights, in some cases the SEC has gone beyond this, finding
no fault with plans granting rather extensive noncontingent rights.4 8  This
approval apparently is a reflection of the feeling that bondholders are en-
titled to this extra protection because they have been forced into reorganiza-
tion proceedings.4 9  This outlook seems questionable. If the corporation
missed); Sayre & Fisher Brick Co., 10 S.E.C. 64 (1941) (preferred shareholders
could elect majority of directors after four semi-annual dividends missed, whether or
not consecutive) ; McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 8 S.E.C. 853 (1941) (preferred share-
holders could elect majority of directors as class if eight consecutive dividend defaults
occurred).
40. Childs Co., 26 S.E.C. 362 (1947). See also Penn Timber Co., 17 S.E.C. 107
(1944) ; Sayre & Fisher Brick Co., 10 S.E.C. 64 (1941).
41. This would be especially true in cases where the preferred shares represent-
a much greater equity in the reorganized corporation than that represented by common
shares.
42. See BmELF, op. cit. supra note 30, at 45.
43. But see Higbee Co., 8 S.E.C. 777 (1941) (preferred shareholders could elect
three out of seven directors, while common shareholders could elect only three, until
seven-year notes were retired, then four; holders of seven-year notes elected seventh
director until the notes were retired).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 616(12) (1952).
45. 11 U.S.C. §616(11) (1952). See text accompanying note 16 supra.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 621 (2) (1952). See text accompanying note 15 supra.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 616(14) (1952).
48. See, e.g., Reynolds Investing Co., 6 S.E.C. 699 (1940) (debentures could elect
three of five directors so long as asset value of debentures outstanding was less than
200% of par; if more than 200% of par, then only two directors were to be elected by
debentures).
49. In some situations, however, approval might be motivated because voting
rights are attached to a new bond issue. If it is necessary to do this in order to
attract new capital, such approval appears proper. See, e.g., San Francisco Bay
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emerges with a sound capital structure, as it must in order for the plan to be
feasible,50 there seems to be little reason to grant bondholders extensive
voting powers. At most, they should be allowed minimal representation
on the board of directors.51
Once the allocation of voting rights has been made, the SEC has
displayed strong concern that it not be disrupted through the future issuance
of voting securities to a new group of individuals. Thus, approval was
denied a plan failing to make provision for pre-emptive rights,5" apparently
based upon chapter X's "fairness provision." 5 At one point, this concern
was so strong that a plan allowing waiver of pre-emptive rights upon
approval of three-quarters of the stock voted was disapproved. 54 However,
a recognition that pre-emptive rights in certain circumstances may impede
or delay the raising of new funds has led the SEC to approve a plan limit-
ing such rights to new issues not offered for sale to the general public.r 5
MErToDs To INsuRE REALIZATION OF THE PowER To CONTROL
The Board of Directors
One of the basic means of granting shareholders an effective power to
control is to make possible the election of a board of directors that will be
responsive to shareholder desires. In this way shareholders can have an
indirect control over daily management activities, yet not interfere with
efficient management. The role of shareholder participation here might
be to allow election of a truly representative board, and to prevent such a
board from entrenching itself and making removal overly difficult when
it is no longer responsive to shareholder desires.
1. Selection of the Initial Board of Directors
The initial board of directors of a reorganized corporation is usually
appointed by the court from a list of nominees.56  In many plans nomina-
Toll-Bridge Co., 6 S.E.C 863 (1940) (class A stock, which held 98% of voting power,
-placed in trust with indenture trustee for new bond issue for ten years; SEC found
no fault, other than suggesting it would be more appropriate to gain bondholder con-
trol by attaching class A stock to the bonds) (plan disapproved on other grounds).
50. See note 35 supra.
51. See, e.g., Kushin Freight Lines, Inc., 29 S.E.C. 724 (1949) (one out of five
directors elected by serial and junior notes) (plan disapproved on other grounds);
Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.EC. 416 (1941) (bondholders could elect one of eleven
directors) (plan disapproved on other grounds).
52. See, e.g., International Ry. Co., 29 S.E.C. 555 (1949). "The pre-emptive
right to subscribe to new securities is a basic right which inures to the benefit of the
individual stockholder by enabling him to maintain and protect his relative position
in the company." Id. at 584.
53. See Inland Gas Corp., 36 S.E.C. 224, 235 (1955).
54. Childs Co., 26 S.E.C. 362 (1947). The SEC said, however, it would approve
a waiver in the case of an issue offered to the general public.
55. Inland Gas Corp., 36 S.E.C. 224, 235 (1955).
56. Silesian-American Corp., 31 S.E.C. 1, 70 (1950). This practice apparently
springs from §221(5), 11 U.S.C. §621(5) (1952), which requires court approval of
initial directors and officers.
INFORMED SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION
tions can be submitted by any group in interest, without any attempt being
made to determine the number of directors to be selected by the court from
a particular group's nominees, 7 while others limit nominations to particular
groups, such as creditors, 58 debenture holders and preferred shareholders.P9
Some plans include in the plan itself the names of those to be appointed. °
A general tendency in these latter plans is toward selection of directors
representing special groups.
In view of the tendency of management to perpetuate itself,6 ' the
selection of the initial board of directors, which in turn will generally select
the initial officers, should be given careful consideration by the reorganiza-
tion courts. Under an ideal system of shareholder participation the
nominees would be selected proportionately by the groups in which voting
power is vested.6 2  Otherwise, for at least the first year, and to a lesser
degree in later years, the directors and officers will not necessarily be
entirely responsive to the desires of those parties with the greatest interest
in proper management. In most situations, this ideal could be reached with
little administrative difficulty, since nominations could be made by protective
committees representing the various groups.P Where a particular group
is not represented by such a committee, individual members of the group
might be allowed to make nominations if it would prove impractical to have
the whole group polled for its nominees.
To some degree, the SEC has exhibited cognizance of the problem
of determining which groups shall have nominating power. It has suggested
that control of the initial board of directors should not be vested as a matter
of course in those persons promulgating the plan,6 and has advised amend-
ment of the plan to correlate nominating power to permanent voting power. 5
An equitable distribution of the power to nominate would seem to be
required by section 221 (5) 66 which states that the judge shall not confirm a
plan unless he is satisfied that the identity, qualifications and affiliations of
directors and officers are "equitable, compatible with the interests of the
creditors and the stockholders and consistent with public policy." Thus, it
would not seem proper for a court to approve a plan in which all of those
57. See, e.g., Broadway-Exchange Corp., 15 S.E.C. 256, 261 (1944) ; Philadelphia
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 10 S.E.C. 714, 725 (1941).
58. Inland Gas Corp., 33 S.E.C. 688, 713-14 (1952).
59. Central States Elec. Corp., 30 S.E.C. 680, 693 (1949).
60. San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., 6 S.E.C. 863, 867 (1940).
61. See Garrett, Attitudes on Corporate Democracy-A Critical Analysis, 51 Nw.
U.L. REv. 310 (1956).
62. This posits that there has been an equitable distribution of voting power.
See text and note above and below note 29 mpra.
63. The court should examine the affiliations of these nominees closely, however,
for those in control of the reorganization may attempt through this means to gain
control of management. See 1 SEC STUDY 863-64 (1937).
64. Sayre & Fisher Brick Co., 10 S.E.C. 64, 76 (1941).
65. Silesian-American Corp., 31 S.E.C. 480, 482 (1950); International Ry. Co.,
29 S.E.C. 555, 556 (1949).
66. 11 U.S.C. §621(5) (1952).
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to be appointed directors are affiliated or identified with a single group,
unless that particular group had the sole interest in the enterprise. Fur-
thermore, the court might also examine the proposed directorate in an
effort to ascertain whether the nominees are fairly representative of various
factions within a particular group. If a plan allows nominations by any
group in interest and places the entire burden of selection upon the court,
the final selection should be guided by the principle of fair representation
of various classes and the different factions within a class. It might be said
that only such a selection, where possible, is equitable and compatible with
the interests of the stockholders.
2. Permanent Methods of Electing the Board of Directors
Although the reorganization court has extensive control over the
make-up of the initial management, attempts to seek court supervision after
the reorganization plan becomes operative have met with little success.
6 7
Therefore, to insure a system of shareholder participation it becomes im-
portant that the plan contain adequate provision for maintaining propor-
tional representation of various interests on the board of directors after it
becomes operative.
A proper allocation of voting power will not necessarily result in
proportional representation on the board of directors. Under ordinary
voting procedures it is possible for a bare majority of votes to elect the
entire board of directors, resulting in no representation on the board for
strong minority groups.68 Thus, in some instances, an entire class might be
excluded, or, in others, a powerful minority faction within a class would be
denied adequate representation. One method of attempting to insure
proportional representation would be the institution of class voting pro-
cedures. A few reorganization plans have provided that each class of secu-
rities, voting as a class, be able to elect a stated number of directors. 9
Although such a provision may lead to proportional representation of the
various classes, it would fall short of insuring proportional representation
of minority factions within a class. This shortcoming gives rise to the
need for a more comprehensive device: cumulative voting. Under such a
system, assuming an allocation of one vote per share, each shareholder
would be able to cast a number of votes equal to the number of his shares
multiplied by the number of directors to be elected.70 All such votes can
be cast for a single director, or can be distributed over a number of
directors. 7' This device will enable minority voting power to be con-
centrated, tending to result in a more representative board of directors than
might normally evolve from ordinary voting procedures. 72
67. See, e.g., Reese v. Beacon Hotel Corp., 149 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1945).
68. See BALLANTINE, COR'OAOTIONS § 177 (rev. ed. 1946).
69. See, e.g., Inland Gas Corp., 29 S.E.C. 377, 400 (1949).
70. ARANow & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 295 (1957).
71. Ibid.
72. See BALLANTINE, CORPRATIONS § 177 (rev. ed. 1946).
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Although some fear has been expressed that cumulative voting may
result in an over-representation of minority groups,73 it has been sug-
gested that, in view of the number of safeguards available to majority
groups,74 this danger is probably more imaginary than real,75 and cumulative
voting may be a very helpful device where needed.7 This latter view has
been adopted by the SEC, as evidenced by its consistent position that re-
organization plans should provide for cumulative voting,77 basing this
position upon the broad "fairness" provision of section 221 (2).78
One method of reducing the effectiveness of cumulative voting is the
practice of classifying boards of directors.79 A classified board is one in
which the directors are divided into a number of classes, only one class
coming up for election each year,8 0 thus reducing the number of vacancies
to be filled at each election. As the number of vacancies decreases, the
effectiveness of cumulative voting also decreases, since a larger number of
shares will be necessary to insure the election of one director. 8' Further-
more, if a group is attempting to gain majority control, this goal will not
be attained as quickly as it would if the board were not classified.8 2 Ap-
parently none of the plans submitted for SEC approval have contained
classification measures, for an examination of SEC opinions reveals no
discussion of the problem. However, it would seem that in light of the
SEC's sensitivity to the desirability of cumulative voting, it would not
approve such a plan.
Control Over Proxy Solicitations
One of the major threats to effective informed shareholder participation
lies in proxy solicitation procedures.P The corporation laws of almost
every state permit shareholders to cast their vote either in person or by
73. ARANOW & ENHORN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 299. The primary danger
lies in a majority group's failure to cumulate voting power or to cumulate it in a
faulty manner.
74. E.g., minority proxy solicitations will indicate the necessity for the majority
to cumulate its power, as will nomination of minority candidates and the possible
requirement of advance notice of intent to accumulate. Furthermore, a voting group
may be empowered to change its ballot. Id. at 300-02.
75. Id. at 300. See also Garrett, supra note 61, at 326.
76. Ibid. For a complete discussion of pros and cons of cumulative voting, comn-
pare Young, The Case for Cuomulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. Rxv. 49, with Axley,
Tlw Case Against Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. Rxv. 278.
77. See Inland Gas Corp., 33 S.E.C. 688, 689 (1952); Silesian-American Corp.
31 S.E.C. 1, 70 (1950) ; International Ry. Co., 29 S.E.C. 555, 556 (1949) ; Flour Mills
of America, Inc., 7 S.E.C. 1, 25 n.77 (1940).
78. Inland Gas Corp., 33 S.E.C. 688, 689 (1952). See text accompanying note 15
supra.
79. ANow & EINHORN, op. cit. stipra note 70, at 312.
80. Id. at 310.
81. See BALLANTINE, Coaro-rioNs § 177 (rev. ed. 1946).
82. ARALow & EINiaoRN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 313.
83. See Garrett, supra note 61, at 312. For an extensive discussion of the rela-
tionship between proxies and shareholder democracy, see Caplin, Proxies, Annual
Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. L. REv. 653 (1951).
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proxy.84 Since personal attendance at shareholder meetings is usually
sparse,8 voting by proxy may become the only effective manner in which
the shareholder can exercise his vote.8 6 On the other hand, an improper
use of this machinery may serve as the major tool for the practical disen-
franchisement of shareholders.8 7 In the absence of adequate legislative
controls such as those discussed below, existing management can gain com-
plete control over this machinery, thereby not only insuring its own re-
election, but also insuring that its own policies will be followed. 88
The most significant development in the control of proxy solicitation
has been the promulgation of proxy rules by the SEC under authority of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.89 The purpose of these regula-
tions is to insure full disclosure, enabling the intelligent use of voting power
by shareholders in both electing directors and voting on major policy
issues, as well as to allow a shareholder the opportunity to present proposals
for consideration by his fellow shareholders through the medium of the
management proxy statement.90 However, these rules do not encompass
all corporations, but are limited both by the enabling legislation and the
rules themselves.91 The major limitation, that a company is not subject
to the rules unless it is "listed" on a national securities exchange, excludes
roughly half the large corporations in the United States.90 2 Since the
coverage of the SEC proxy rules and regulations is not so broad as to
include all corporations subject to the provisions of chapter X,9 there is
a substantial possibility that a corporation will emerge from reorganization
with insufficient control over proxy solicitations. In the absence of ap-
plicable legislation, such control might be included in the corporation's
own charter. Such internal regulation might be suggested by the SEC
and required by the bankruptcy courts. This approach could be based
on either one of two chapter X provisions: a reorganization plan without
proxy controls might be said to lack compliance with the fairness require-
ments of section 221(2),19 or it could be considered as not including a
provision that is equitable to stockholders with respect to the manner of
84. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 408 (rev. ed. 1946).
85. Among the reasons given for sparse attendance are the wide diffusion and
large number of shareholders, inconvenient location of meetings, and the general
apathy of shareholders. See Caplin, supra note 83, at 655.
86. Ibid.
87. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
244-45 (1932); RoHRLIcH, THE SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REroaM 2 (1950).
88. See Garrett, sufra note 61, at 312.
89. 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78n (1952).
90. See ARANOW & EINHORN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 82.
91. Id. at 84.
92. See Bayne, Aroumd and Beyond the SEC-The Disenfranchised Stockholder,
26 IND. L.J. 207, 223 (1951).
93. The Bankruptcy Act contains no limitation based upon size of corporations
subject to its provisions.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1952). See text accompanying note 15 mtpra.
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selection of persons who are to be directors, within the meaning of section
216(11).95
Although the avenue for internal regulation could be considered open,
neither the bankruptcy courts nor the SEC have availed themselves of this
opportunity. This failure might be attributed to a hesitancy to use a
"back-door" approach through the bankruptcy power when the front door
has been open to Congress through the commerce power. This would be
especially true since Congress, through the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, has chosen to limit the jurisdiction of proxy solicitations only to cer-
tain classes of corporations. Since there is some indication that coverage
of the SEC proxy rules and regulations will be increased, any dangers to an
ideal system of shareholder participation inherent in the absence of such
provisions may soon be diminished. A proposed amendment would increase
coverage to include companies with assets of over $2 million and more than
750 stockholders or $1 million in debt securities.9 6 Admittedly this will
still leave a limited number of fairly large corporations emerging from re-
organizations that are not covered by proxy legislation. However, the
problem of proxy solicitations, as noted above,9 7 becomes acute only when
there are a large number of shareholders widely diffused, with a resulting
sparse attendance at shareholder meetings. This situation might be allevi-
ated by an insistence on the part of reorganization courts that the place of
shareholder meetings be set where convenient to the greatest number of
shareholders or that the reorganized corporation's charter include provisions
governing proxy solicitation as discussed above.
Voting Trusts
One of the most effective means of reducing the realization of the
shareholders' power to control is use of the voting trust 8 Under a voting
trust agreement, a group of trustees, often a part of management, is formed
and vested with complete power to vote all stock placed in trust with it.9'
These agreements have met with diverse treatment in state courts. While
a minority have held them illegal per se,0 0 the prevailing view is that they
95. 11 U.S.C. § 616(11) (1952). See text accompanying note 16 supra.
96. S. 1168, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The SEC has already indicated its
approval of this bill in connection with an earlier legislative attempt with similar pro-
visions, S. 2054, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). See REPORT OF THE SEcuRms AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON S. 2054 TO THE COMMISSION ON BANKING AND CURiRrENCY
(1956).
97. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
98. See BEm & MEANs, op. cit. supra note 87, at 77. "[T]he security holder
who enters one of these voting trusts or liquidation trusts has for all practical purposes
relinquished any real control which he may have formerly had. He is eliminated from
the picture when it comes to proxy formulation; he has at best a negative power to
dissent under certain circumstances and only a cumbersome and unwieldy power to
remove trustees or to terminate the trust if he thinks the proper policies are not
being pursued. For all practical purposes he is out of control of the situation; the
trustees are in a position of absolute power and dominion." 3 SEC STUDY 205 (1936).
99. BmE & MEANs, op. cit. supra note 87, at 77.
100. See BALLANTINE, CoaRo0ATioNs 425-26 (rev. ed. 1946).
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are valid even in the absence of enabling statutes, except where an improper
motive or objective is shown. 101
The SEC, citing the requirement of section 216(11) 102 that a plan
contain fair and equitable voting provisions, and the prohibition of section
216(12) 1113 against issuing non-voting stock, has exhibited a tendency
toward adopting a prohibitive view. This attitude is reflected by its dis-
approval of a plan containing a ten-year voting trust which required the vote
or written consent of the majority of the holders of voting trust certificates
for such important matters as sale of assets, consolidation, merger, liquida-
tion except under certain circumstances, or settlement of specified claims.' 04
Although it did not specifically object to voting trusts in a few plans
predicated upon special needs,'0 5 in a recent pronouncement it disapproved
a plan with a voting trust allegedly based upon the desire to enable the
stock to be held intact for delivery to a purchaser of the reorganized cor-
poration in the event the purchaser desired to acquire the capital stock of
the company rather than its assets generally.'0 8 The SEC suggested that
if the only purpose of the trust was to facilitate sale of the capital stock
of the reorganized corporation, the plan could be amended to provide for an
escrow agreement, with shareholders receiving temporary negotiable instru-
ments evidencing ownership and carrying full voting rights.'0 7 Thus, sale
could be facilitated, but the shareholders could retain the right to determine
whether the company should be sold.'0 8
Reorganization courts have not taken the same position on voting
trusts as has been adopted by the SEC. The courts, holding that voting
trusts neither violate the prohibition of the issuance of non-voting shares, 0 9
nor render a plan unfair or impair its feasibility," 0 have approved these
agreements over objections raised by the SEC. In the leading case of
In re Quaker City Storage Co.,"'- despite the SEC's refusal to approve the
plan, the court granted approval, saying "the assurance of a continuance of
101. Id. at 426.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 616(11) (1952). See text accompanying note 16 supra.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 616(12) (1952). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
104. Silesian-American Corp., 31 S.E.C. 1, 32 (1950).
105. See Central States Elec. Corp., 30 S.E.C. 680, 693 (1949) (voting trust to
be instituted if necessary to effectuate merger) ; Mortgage Guar. Co., 8 S.E.C. 499,
511 (1941) (ten-year voting trust with plan for eventual liquidation; two-thirds vote
of trust certificates could terminate existing management and two-thirds vote could
compel immediate sale of corporate property).
106. Inland Gas Corp., 33 S.E.C. 688, 727 (1952). However, the voting trustees
were actually empowered to vote stock held by them for the election of directors and
in connection with any other matter which might otherwise be subject to action by
the stockholders.
107. Ibid.
108. Id. at 728. A plan so amended was approved. Inland Gas Corp., 34 S.E.C.
624 (1953).
109. In re Quaker City Cold Storage Co., 71 F. Supp. 124, 131 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
110. In re Lower Broadway Properties, 58 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
111. 71 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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good management is essential, and this is provided through a voting
trust." 112
The holding of the Quaker City case does not necessarily mean, how-
ever, that courts will give blanket approval to voting trusts. Recognizing
that they are "undemocratic," the court said, by way of dictum, that they
should be employed sparingly and only when special circumstances re-
quire.1 3 The special circumstances deemed adequate in Quaker City
were that the great body of bondholders and preferred shareholders in the
reorganized corporation were inexperienced in managing this type of enter-
prise, having never before exercised any voice in the management of the
company. The former controlling group would get twenty-five per cent
of the voting power, with the rest widely distributed to 700 individuals,
thus making likely the reversion of actual control to a strong minority." 4
Furthermore, there was a good deal of protection afforded the shareholders
in the trust agreement. Periodic reports were to be made, a referendum
was required on matters of major importance, and the trust could be
terminated on vote of the majority of outstanding voting trust certificates." 5
Accepting the court's conclusion that the special circumstances were ade-
quate in light of the strong safeguards to security holders, the Quaker City
plan presented a strong case for approval. What might be done in a weaker
factual situation remains open to speculation.
In cases where voting trusts have been approved, the reorganization
courts have not left the shareholder interests entirely at the whim of the
trustees. The voting trustees are subject to the broad trust doctrine pro-
hibiting them from exercising granted powers "in a way that is detrimental
to the cestuis que trustent." 116 The court has considered its approval of
the voting trust to create "what was, in effect, a contract with the court and
creditors" that the trustee will act properly." 7 Thus an accounting was
ordered in a case where the trustees failed to adequately perform their
duties," 8 and the court, in another case, struck down an attempted amend-
ment of the corporation's charter to extend control by the trustees, even
though the trust agreement allowed the trustees to vote on charter amend-
ments.' 1 9
CONCLUSION
An examination of the legislative history of the chapter X provisions
under which forms of shareholder participation might be promulgated by
112. Id. at 128.
113. Id. at 131.
114. Id. at 130-31. Although the court deemed these circumstances special, it is
questionable whether these same problems do not appear in almost any corporation,
at least to some degree.
115. Id. at 131.
116. Brown v. McLanahan, 148 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1945).
117. In re Dale Transp. Lines, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 91, 92 (W.D. Pa. 1943).
118. Ibid.
119. Brown v. McLanahan, 148 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1945).
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reorganization courts reveals little indication of their real purpose. One
possibility is that they were meant to give the court a negative control, i.e.,
to prevent reorganization from being used as a tool by the reorganization
committees to seize control of the emerging corporation. On the other
hand, a strong possibility is that they were meant to grant reorganization
courts discretionary power to institute an extensive affirmative program
of shareholder participation. If the latter was their purpose, the question
still remains whether Congress has properly acted within the scope of the
bankruptcy power in fostering such an affirmative program. The answer
to this problem will largely depend upon the causal connection between
shareholder participation and the broad policy objectives of chapter X-
the rehabilitation rather than liquidation of insolvent corporations. 20 If
shareholder participation will aid the prevention of recurring ineffective
management, thus supporting rehabilitation, it would then appear to be a
proper area for congressional activity under the bankruptcy power. But, if
the sole basis for adopting forms of shareholder participation lies in the
policy determination that as a matter of fairness shareholders should have
control over how their capital is used, this would not seem to be a proper
area for federal control under the bankruptcy power.
The precise causal connection between minority representation (which
is the goal of equitable distribution of voting power 12' combined with
cumulative voting and a prohibition against classified boards of directors)
and a decrease of ineffective management is difficult to ascertain. There is
no doubt that the advocates of minority representation base their position
in part upon a sense of fairness.' However, this is not the sole reason put
forth. Minority representation is said to serve "not only as a brake on in-
efficiency and mismanagement, but as an incentive for better performance
by those in power." m More specifically, advocates of minority repre-
sentation claim sounder business decisions will be reached because a vigilant
minority is on hand to constantly scrutinize majority proposals and test
their soundness before action is taken.' 2 4 Fewer mistakes, it is said, will
be made by a management faced with the necessity of explaining its ac-
tivities to critical minority shareholders. 1' However, these arguments
have not remained unanswered. In opposition, it is claimed that directors
should work as a team for the benefit of all and not be composed of separate
120. See 81 CoNG. REc. 8679 (1938).
121. Minority representation on the board of directors is not the sole reason for
an equitable distribution of the power to vote. It would also lead to a more repre-
sentative decision on matters determined by direct shareholder vote, such as those
raised by proxy proposals.
122. See, e.g., Steadman, Should Cumulative Voting for Directors Be Manuda-
tory?-A Debate, 11 Bus. LAw. 9, 11 (Nov. 1955) : "The fact is that the principle of
minority representation is deeply ingrained in American thinking and is a part of the
American concept of fair play."
123. Young, The Case for Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 49, 54.
124. Id. at 53.
125. Ibid.
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representatives of minority interests, thus creating friction.12 6 Furthermore,
it is argued, the majority and management will be put under strong
psychological pressure to avoid mistakes that the opposition could turn to
its disadvantage, and thus long range planning and aggressive administra-
tion may suffer through consequent overcaution.
2 7
Despite the difficulty of ascertaining this connection it would not appear
prima fade unreasonable for Congress to conclude that decisions subjected
to active criticism that can be brought about by minority representation
will tend to be more sound. That Congress has reached this conclusion
appears from the expressed purpose of section 216(11) 2s -to "direct the
scrutiny of the court to the methods by which management of the re-
organized corporation is to be chosen, so as to insure, for example, adequate
representation of those whose investments are involved in the reorganiza-
tion." 1' There is little reason to think this conclusion is likely to be at-
tacked, for the burden of proving the lack of an adequate causal connection
may prove quite difficult.
The ascertainment of the connection between other aspects of informed
shareholder participation and increased corporate financial stability appears
less difficult than that of minority representation on the boards of directors.
Control over proxy solicitations and limitation of voting trusts to situations
where their purpose is other than insulating management activities from
shareholder disapproval will make removal of ineffective management less
difficult. A requirement that meetings be held at a place convenient to the
greatest number of shareholders would also lessen the effectiveness of
management control over proxy machinery. A requirement allowing share-
holder proposals to be made either on management proxies or at shareholder
meetings would broaden sources of ideas and allow comparison of possible
alternative courses of action.
The success of these devices will be partially dependent upon the intel-
ligence and interest displayed by shareholders in exercising their powers.
Critics of shareholder participation have questioned the realism of expecting
small investors to take an active interest in the affairs of the corporation and
their ability to make sound decisions in respect to questions of large-scale
corporate operation. 30 However, advocates of shareholder participation
suggest that there is much evidence that the shareholder is "being educated
and experiencing an awakening of the breadth of his intellectual capacity
126. This is the principle argument made by many management proxies when
the question of whether or not to adopt cumulative voting is put up for shareholder
vote. For a summary of some of these management proxy statements, see Gibson,
Should Cumulative Voting for Directors Be Mandatory?-A Debate, 11 Bus. LAw. 22,
26-28 (Nov. 1955).
127. WILLIAMs, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRcToRs 165 (1951).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 616(11) (1952).
129. S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1938).
130. For a rather extreme statement of this position see Note, 53 HAzy. L. REv.
1165, 1173 (1940) : "[A] considerable body of security holders lack sufficient capacity
to understand any phase of corporate activity, no matter how simply expressed. ....
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for corporate as well as general understanding," 131 and that if shareholders
are given the opportunity to exercise a real sense of control over the affairs
of their companies, there would be renewed interest.M Again, as in the
case of minority representation, it would not seem prima facie unreasonable
for Congress to conclude there is a sufficient correlation between these
matters and corporate financial stability to support controls erected under
the bankruptcy power. On the other hand, since there is existing federal
control over proxy solicitations enacted under the commerce power, it
may be doubted that Congress intended to extend the discretionary power
of the reorganization courts in this field.
A significant limitation of the effectiveness of a program of shareholder
participation instituted under the reorganization court's discretionary powers,
however, may lie in the court's inability to prevent a change in a corpora-
tion's form of management and selection of management once the court has
made a final confirmation of the plan. Although it may be proper for the
court to exercise jurisdiction to insure that the corporation is formed in
accordance with the approved plan, there is no indication that Congress
desired judicial supervision once the plan becomes operative.133 However,
this limitation would not completely negate judicial activity in the area. At
the very least it would prevent reorganization proceedings from being used
as a means of vesting power to control the corporation in a particular group.
In addition, once the power to control is granted to shareholders, the
onerous burden of moving forward to abrogate forms of shareholder par-
ticipation would be placed upon management.
L I. W.
131. EMERSON & LATHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCACY 10 (1954).
132. See Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The
Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. L. Ra,. 653, 656 (1951).
133. Cf. FINLETrER, PRINCIPLES OF CoRoPRA REORGANIZATIONS INr BANKC-
RuPrcy 451-52 (1937). Speaking of feasibility under the old § 77B, the author says,
"While the most complete control by the court of the original set-up of the reorganized
company is proper, any reservation to the court of operating control after the plan
is effected seems to go beyond the purpose of the act" Id. at 452.
